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by Willem B. Drees
Abstract. Such terms as materialism, naturalism, and near
synonyms evoke strong negative reactions among many believers.
However, the notion of naturalism has various meanings; implica-
tions for religion differ for the several varieties of naturalism. In
this paper I analyze epistemological and ontological variants of
naturalism and explore the perspectives for religion within a non-
reductive ontological naturalism.
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Materialism is now the dominant systematic ontology among philosophers and
scientists, and there are currently no established alternative ontological views
competing with it. As a result, typical theoretical work in philosophy and the
sciencesisconstrained,implicitlyorexplicitly,bythevariousconceptionsofwhat
materialism entails. Reductive and eliminative versions of materialism now
compete with nonreductive species for the best rendition of materialism as a sys-
tematic ontology.
—P. K. Moser and J. D. Trout, eds.
Contemporary Materialism: A Reader
One possible agenda for science and theology is to articulate a nonnatu-
ralist (or nonmaterialist) ontology that is compatible with science and
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© 1997 by the Joint Publication Board of Zygon. ISSN 0591-2385hospitable to religious convictions. Because I think naturalism is a
stronger contender than currently available alternatives (see below, sec.
2), I prefer another agenda, namely, to reflect on the meaning of natu-
ralism (sec. 1) and on the possibilities for religion in the scientific image
of our world that thus arise (sec. 3). I argue that naturalism need not be
identified with atheism. Rather, it can be seen as a reflection of the cre-
ated integrity of the natural order; the divine can be identified with the
prime cause or ground of the web of natural causes. The actual way this
created integrity turns out to be, as an evolutionary one, allows us a sec-
ond way of envisaging religion, namely, as traditions of explicit and
implicit wisdom.
1. SCIENCE AND NATURALISM
1.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENCE. Science studies realities that
are to a large extent independent of humans and of human attempts to
find out about them. In that sense, I take a realist view of science. How-
ever, such a realism does not carry us very far in debates on scientific real-
ism, which are in my view not debates about the existence of reality out
there but rather debates about the quality of our knowledge. Which
theories, or which elements in our theories, can we take seriously as de-
picting the way reality is, and to what extent? What criteria should we
apply when we attempt to answer such questions? Scientific explanations
and concepts are provisional human constructs organizing the natural
world; they are not independent of human intellectual capacities, social
interactions, and contingencies of history, although one can speak mean-
ingfully of The Advancement of Science (Kitcher 1993).
One major characteristic of the sciences is their wide scope; their
domain seems to be without obvious boundaries. Terrestrial physics is
applicable to heavenly phenomena as well, and chemistry to processes in
living beings. The domain of the sciences extends from the smallest
objects to the universe at large, from extremely brief phenomena to the
stability of rocks, and from heavy objects to massless light. Scientific
knowledge also exhibits a significant inner coherence. Although it may be
strongly violated temporarily, coherence has always reestablished itself as
a result of later scientific developments. Coherence has become a crite-
rion that makes us extremely suspicious of purported knowledge that
stands in splendid isolation, even if it does not conflict with the rest of
our knowledge.
Science enlarges and changes our view of the known world (e.g.,
McMullin 1994, 81). Scientific theories postulate entities and concepts
of a kind not found in the data. They thereby offer us scientific images of
the world that differ from our manifest images (Sellars 1963). This is
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intimately related to manifest images.
Contemporary natural science is stable and provisional. It is stable in
the sense that many branches of science seem to be cumulative, building
upon knowledge acquired in the last few centuries. For instance, it seems
extremely unlikely that physicists and chemists ever will abandon their
belief in atoms and in the periodic table. However, science is also provi-
sional, and it is provisional not merely because we may extend our
knowledge into new domains but also because we may reach a deeper
understanding of domains already known and as a consequence modify
our views.
Isn’t Reality More “Wild” Than Science Can Express? One objection
to the prominence given to science by naturalists is that it applies only to
those aspects of reality amenable to scientific study. Is reality not in its
wildness “hopelessly beyond science’s powers to analyze”? As the novelist
John Fowles expressed it in The Tree, “Ordinary experience, from waking
second to second, is...hopelessly beyond science’s powers to analyse. It
is quintessentially ‘wild,’ in the sense my father disliked so much: unphi-
losophical, uncontrollable, incalculable” (1979, 40f). In my opinion, this
wildness is a genuine feature of reality, and it should make us modest
with respect to the claim that scientific theories can explicate all actual
experience. Irreducibility should be part of our understanding of reality.
However, this “wildness” is itself intelligible within a naturalist view
inspired by the sciences, as I argue in the remainder of this subsection.
Thus, the richness of experience does not count against a naturalist view
of reality.
How is it intelligible that ordinary experience seems “hopelessly
beyond science’s powers to analyse”? We tend to use models of reality
that are too simplistic, such as metaphors from technology (“letting off
steam” and more recent computer metaphors). There is nothing against
such metaphors, but wild nature, including human nature, is richer than
such technological metaphors can express. Another reason for the wild-
ness of human experience is that we as humans do not (and cannot)
monitor our inner states. Furthermore, the causal webs of responding to
the environment are the product of our convoluted history, as a species
and individually.
We are also limited with respect to detailed explanations of particular
events. Chaos theory has made clear what should have been obvious to
students of historical evidence: we never have sufficient knowledge of all
the details to provide a full account of the course of events. As long as the
concept of explanation is not used in an overdemanding way (which
would make it hard to find any cases where anything is explained), such
limitations do not imply that the development of current life-forms or
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are explained when underlying causes or mechanisms are discerned (an
ontic notion of explanation) and when they are located in a wider theo-
retical framework (an epistemic notion of explanation; see Salmon 1990).
Quantum physics may be interpreted as showing that there are limita-
tions to the determinateness not only of our knowledge but also of real-
ity. However, even then we may consider the outcome of a quantum
event to have been explained when it is understood as one of the possible
outcomes given the situation.
In addition to the limitations mentioned so far, there is also a limita-
tion of a conceptual kind: sciences describing higher, more complex levels
of reality need concepts that are not adequately expressible in the con-
cepts of physics; they cut the pie of reality into intelligible units and
processes in different ways. This shows up especially clearly in the rela-
tionship between biology on the one hand and physics and chemistry on
the other. In physics and chemistry, phenomena are classified primarily in
terms of what they do and of their microstructure, whereas in biology,
phenomena are classified primarily in terms of their purpose and
function.
The history of science may also shed light on the adequacy of scien-
tific images. The first phase of modern physics and chemistry was the
study of simple phenomena. Thus, they passed over the complexities of
friction in physics and of surface phenomena in chemistry. An enormous
amount of abstraction and simplification (compared to the real world)
was needed to develop theories with some depth. In this phase, science
was clearly inadequate for complex phenomena outside the lab. However,
in this century, the scope of science has expanded enormously. Scientists
now study complicated processes such as those not in equilibrium and
processes in thin layers. Increased computing power and powerful tech-
niques in molecular biology and physics have joined forces. Thus, science
is getting better able to study the complexity of the real world.
Although scientists are in many cases able to understand how a par-
ticular phenomenon fits into the larger picture, this insight comes at a
price; often the actual process is understood to be the consequence of
processes that cannot be traced in full detail, either because the phe-
nomenon has a history about which we have insufficient data (e.g., evo-
lutionary histories of species) or because it concerns a system about
which we cannot know the actual state of affairs at a single moment
(either for apparently ontological reasons, as in quantum physics, or for
epistemological reasons, as in chaotic systems such as the weather).
Despite these limitations, or perhaps even because of them, science is
now able to face more than the garden where reality is pruned to make it
manageable to science; wild reality comes in sight again. It is a
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cessful, that is, that simplification has opened up a route to understand-
ing complex phenomena. As a consequence of the detour through the
study of simpler systems, science now more fully understands wild reality
in its variety and at the same time its own limitations in explanatory and
predictive power.
1.2. VARIETIES OF NATURALISM. The label naturalism is used in
various ways. One distinction, introduced by Strawson (1985), is
between soft and hard naturalism. In the soft understanding, naturalism
refers to what we ordinarily do and believe as humans, what we say about
colors, feelings, and moral judgments. When a painting is considered
naturalist, it is in this soft sense. The hard version, according to Straw-
son, attempts to view human behavior in an objective, detached light as
events in nature. This distinction corresponds to the distinction made
above between manifest and scientific images. I am of the opinion that in
the light of the successes of science we have to give hard naturalism prior-
ity over soft naturalism; science, in many instances on good grounds, cor-
rects our (soft) natural understanding of reality.
In his typology of views of the relationship between science and relig-
ion, Ian Barbour characterized scientific materialism with “two assertions:
(1) the scientific method is the only reliable path to knowledge; (2) mat-
ter (or matter and energy) is the fundamental reality in the universe”
(Barbour 1990, 4). The first assertion is epistemological, the second one
ontological. Clarity is served and problems about scientism are avoided, I
think, if we distinguish explicitly between those two assertions. Before
explicating an ontological understanding of naturalism, which I consider
the relevant one, let me first describe epistemological naturalism.
In the Encyclopedia of Philosophy Danto (1967, 448) defines “natural-
ism” as the view that whatever exists or happens is “susceptible to expla-
nation through methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in
the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects
and events.” Such a naturalism is “a methodological rather than an onto-
logical monism...,amonism leaving them [philosophers] free to be
dualists, idealists, materialists, atheists, or nonatheists, as the case may
be.” Such a methodological understanding of naturalism is held to be
neutral (and thus, one could say, friendly) toward religion by abstaining
from ontological claims. However, I see two major disadvantages to the
definition.
a. If “continuity of methods” is given some discriminating sense, it
may exclude too many relevant intellectual enterprises. Methodological
or epistemological naturalism does not accommodate more metaphori-
cally laden forms of discourse, such as are characteristic of the humanities
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mologically reductionist form of ontological naturalism, but an ontologi-
cal understanding of naturalism need not assume such an epistemological
reductionism.
b. If continuity with scientific methods is the main criterion, questions
that cannot be answered by these methods will be dismissed as meaning-
less, whereas if naturalism is understood in ontological terms, there is no
ground to dismiss such questions a priori. This is especially relevant
when we pose questions regarding the framework of existence and order
assumed (rather than explained) by the sciences. The methodological
naturalist has to dismiss such questions, whereas an ontological naturalist
can be more open-minded with respect to limit questions.
Ontological Varieties of Naturalism. Ontological naturalism comes
in varieties (Moser and Trout 1995, 5). Reductive materialists take it that
regularities in “higher” phenomena such as mental states correlate with
regularities at the level of physical processes (type-type identity). Nonre-
ductive materialists reject a strict correlation between physical and psycho-
logical properties and regularities, even though each actual mental event
is physically embodied (token-token identity). Money exists as precious
metals, paper, electronic codes, and seashells; it would be neither feasible
nor helpful to deal with economic processes in terms of the physical char-
acteristics of money. The taxonomy of a science describing higher-level
phenomena need not carve up the world in the same way as physics.
According to eliminative materialists, we should eliminate higher-level
notions rather than understand how they are embedded in material real-
ity. For instance, Paul Churchland (1981) holds that our folk psychology
with notions of desire and belief will fade out of existence once it is
replaced by a more adequate neurophysiological vocabulary. This is a
gross overstatement (Schwartz 1991). Once one understands how a con-
cept from a higher level of description is understood in terms of the
lower level, the original term may be superfluous (in the rare case of an
exhaustive type-type reduction), but it is not thereby dismissed. If the
temperature of a gas can be identified with its mean kinetic energy, there
is nothing wrong with saying that the temperature of the air in my room
is currently 291 degrees Kelvin.
Reductive materialism and eliminativism claim too much; some vari-
ety of nonreductive ontological naturalism is more adequate.
1.3. A NONREDUCTIVE ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM. Nonmate-
rial aspects of reality, such as music, science, and social meanings, are not
studied as such by any of the natural sciences, but they seem to be always
embodied in forms that are in the domain of the natural sciences,
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brain, and only as embodied do they seem to be causally efficacious.
Hence, a characteristic of contemporary naturalistic scientific images is
their ontological naturalism, resting on the assumptions articulated below.
a. The natural world is the whole of reality that we know of and interact
with; no supernatural or spiritual realm distinct from the natural world
shows up within our natural world, not even in the mental life of humans.
The word within has been emphasized to signal an important qualifi-
cation, namely, that answers to questions about the natural world as a
whole may refer to something beyond the natural world (see below, 1.4).
The coherence of our knowledge seems to correlate with the view that
different entities are constituted from the same basic stuff, say, atoms and
forces. Interactions and spatial relations between constituents are, of
course, included in this view of reality; contemporary physics treats
forces, particles, and space-time together. Thus, a constitutive reduction-
ism is part of this scientific image.
b. Our natural world is a unity in the sense that all entities are made up
of the same constituents. Physics offers us the best available description of these
constituents and thus of our natural world at its most basic and detailed level
of analysis.
Constitutive reduction does not imply elimination; pain does not
become less real or painful when its physiological basis is unraveled.
However, in many instances (even within physics, and even more when
one moves from the causal descriptions offered by physics and chemistry
to the functional descriptions offered by biology and “higher” disciplines)
we encounter a conceptual and explanatory nonreductionism.
c. The description and explanation of phenomena may require concepts
that do not belong to the vocabulary of fundamental physics, especially if such
phenomena involve complex arrangements of constituent particles or extensive
interactions with a specific environment.
With respect to living organisms, evolutionary biology has become a
powerful pattern of explanation that is not primarily in terms of con-
stituents and laws (physics) but in terms of interactions between organ-
isms and their environments. Its explanatory schemes are primarily
functional: within the constraints due to natural history, traits that con-
tribute to the functioning of an organism (or more precisely, to the
propagation of that trait in a given environment) are likely to become
more abundant than competing traits that are functionally less
advantageous.
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gence of various traits in organisms and ecosystems; such explanations focus on
the contribution these traits have made to the inclusive fitness of organisms in
which they were present.
A side remark: Some theists seek to supplement evolution with addi-
tional factors, a kind of divine guidance or lure. If such additional factors
rooted in divine intelligence are supposed to make a difference, would
one not expect that there would be fewer blind alleys and suboptimal
solutions? Is there any evidence of foresight in evolution, for instance, in
a less than optimal solution resulting in a better solution a thousand gen-
erations down the line? In that sense the success of evolutionary theory in
understanding imperfections seems to be as much a challenge to those
who would like to supplement evolution with theistic guidance as its suc-
cesses in understanding successful adaptations.
1.4. ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM IS NOT NECESSARILY ATHEISTIC.
Reductionistic explanations within a naturalist framework do not explain
the framework itself, as a thumbnail sketch of the sciences may illustrate.
Concerning the properties of genes, a biologist may refer to the biochem-
ist in the next office. When asked “when and where did the ninety-two
elements arise?” the chemist can refer to the astrophysicist. The astro-
physicist might answer in terms of nuclear processes in stars and in the
early universe, referring for further explanations to the nuclear physicist
and the cosmologist. This chain of referring to the person in the next of-
fice ends, if successful at all, with the cosmologist and the elementary
particle physicist, the one answering the ultimate historical questions and
the other exploring the most basic structural aspects of reality (Misner
1977, 97; Weinberg 1992, 242).
e. Fundamental physics and cosmology form a boundary of the natural sci-
ences, where speculative questions with respect to a naturalist view of our
world come most explicitly to the forefront. The questions that arise at the
speculative boundary I will call limit questions (LQ).
The questions left at the metaphorical last desk are questions about the
world as a whole, its existence and structure (and not only questions
about its beginning). Such limit questions are persistent, even though
the development of science may change the shape of the actual ultimate
questions considered at any time. Naturalism does not imply the dis-
missal of such limit questions as meaningless, nor does it imply one par-
ticular answer to them. Religious views of reality that do not assume
that a transcendent realm shows up within the natural world but under-
stand the natural world as a whole as a creation dependent upon a tran-
scendent Creator—a view that might perhaps be articulated with the
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between temporal processes in the world and timeless dependence of the
world (including its temporal extension) on God—are consistent with
such a naturalism.
To describe the field differently, we may distinguish between four
views of God’s relation to natural reality and its regularities, of which two
can be labeled naturalist. These two are often conflated, to the disadvan-
tage of the religious one.
Radical Nonnaturalism. Some religious people have no particular
interest in the way the world operates; when God acts, God can do so
against any laws of nature. You might see it as shifting from the auto-
matic pilot to manual control; although on the basis of natural processes
one would expect A to happen, God makes event B happen. A problem
with such a view of God’s relation to the world is that it adversely affects
our esteem for God’s creation, which is apparently of such a kind that
God has to interfere against God’s own creation.
Contingent Nonnaturalism. Some authors argue that God need
not act against the laws of nature; there is enough looseness (contin-
gency) in the web God created in the first place to allow for particular
divine actions. This looseness might perhaps be located in complex and
chaotic systems (e.g., Polkinghorne 1991; see, for some objections, Drees
1995) or at the quantum level (e.g., Russell 1995). The natural order
could result in a couple of different outcomes, say A, B, C, and D, and
God makes C rather than A, B,o rDhappen. This view depends on a
proper role of contingency of an ontological kind in nature, whether at
the quantum level or elsewhere.
Naturalism Emphasizing the Integrity of the Natural World. Natu-
ralism need not deny the existence of such contingency in nature; per-
haps quantum physics should be understood as making it clear that
natural reality is to some extent hazy and underdetermined. However, it
abstains from supplementing natural reality with additional supranatural
determining factors. Chance can be taken as chance and not as hidden
determination. Naturalism accepts that nature is, when we consider the
level of causal interactions, complete, without relevant holes. Created
reality, the natural world, has an integrity that need not be supplemented
within its web of interactions. However, this integrity is not to be con-
fused with self-sufficiency; it does not imply that natural reality owes its
existence to itself or is self-explanatory. We need to distinguish between
naturalism as emphasizing the integrity of the natural world, and natural-
ism as claiming also the self-sufficiency of the natural world.
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argument about self-sufficiency is quite different from any argument about
explanations within the natural world, because here we have to do with the
contingency of existence rather than contingency in existence. This is a dif-
ference that a polemical atheist like Peter Atkins slides over when he claims
that science is about to explain everything. He can trace everything back to
a beginning of utmost simplicity, but he cannot do this without assuming
existence and a framework where certain rules apply and mathematics
applies. A naturalist need not assume the self-sufficiency of the framework
when seeing the framework itself as a whole that has integrity.
If a religious believer accepts naturalism as integrity, it is still possible
to see God as the creator of this framework, the ground of its existence.
This is best understood, in my opinion, as a nontemporal notion. When
God is not seen as one who interferes, the alternative is not to see God as
the creator who started it all a long time ago but rather to think of God
as the one who gives all moments and places of reality their existence and
order.
2. WHY NOT A RICHER NATURALISM?
Naturalism as presented here is a metaphysical position. It goes beyond
the details of insights offered by the sciences in an attempt to present a
general view of the reality in which we live and of which we are a part. It
is a low-level metaphysics, however, in that it stays close to the insights
offered and concepts developed in the sciences, rather than that it
imposes certain metaphysical categories on the sciences or requires a
modification of science so that it may fit a metaphysical position taken a
priori.
Hermeneutical approaches, which are at odds with an epistemological
variant of naturalism, may concur with the five assumptions discussed
above. There are other views, however, that are at odds with this natural-
ism. By emphasizing the integrity of the natural world, this view excludes
ontological dualisms (except for a dualism between creator and creature).
Angels, ghosts, or other nonembodied minds acting in natural reality are
excluded. However, there is nothing to prevent humans from discovering
certain invariant truths about geometry—and thus constructing or dis-
covering a sort of Platonic realm of timeless truths.
The label religious naturalism,o rempirical theology, is used for a variety
of positions similar to the view taken here. For instance, in an essay on
science and empirical theology, Karl E. Peters wrote, “Human fulfillment
and the ultimate source of fulfillment are to be found not beyond the
spatial-temporal world but within it. If there are realms of being other
than space-time nature and history (as in supernaturalism), they are
beyond our ken and have no relevance to life today” (Peters 1992a, 63).
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prominent place given to physics in constitutive reductionism; they
prefer “organic” metaphors. For instance, Nancy Frankenberry claims
that “the fundamental image of nature in terms of interpenetrating
fields of forces and organically integrated wholes has replaced that of
self-contained, externally related bits of particles of inert matter”
(Frankenberry 1992, 39). And Frederick Ferré saw a new image of the
world: “If the image of the Garden, in which humanity and nature
interact with balance and mutual benefit, becomes a fundamental
image of our world, it will of course be easier to see how the Machine
can fit—as an inorganic simplification and servant of the organic—
than it is now to understand how a Garden could come to grow in the
cosmic Machine.” Ferré believes that the postmodern sciences “have
broken sharply with the ideals and assumptions that have been identi-
fied with modern science for long centuries.” He refers briefly to quan-
tum physics, but his main example is ecology, which “includes and
transcends analysis in a holistic way that is essential to its conceptual
task” (1993, 95, 93, 94).
As long as it is a preference for organic metaphors, I have no objec-
tions. However, as a different view of the sciences and their description of
reality, I am not convinced by the plea for an alternative view. Quantum
physics, on some interpretations, introduces nonlocal correlations, but it
does not thereby introduce into our picture of the world holism in a
sense related to subjectivity or values. I consider revealing Ferré’s state-
ment that it is easier to understand how the Machine fits in the Garden
than the reverse. He thereby largely abandons mainstream theories of
evolution, which see more complex entities as products rather than as ini-
tial states. Claims about a transition from modern to postmodern science
underestimate the success and the potential for further development of
modern science in the way it has progressed over the last few centuries.
There are interesting changes in science, which have triggered various
debates in the philosophy of physics and elsewhere. Ideas on space and
time, substance, and determinism have acquired a new shape. However,
neither these changes in science nor these philosophical discussions war-
rant the claim that there has been a “reintegration of understanding with
valuational intuition” (1993, 95). Science is not modified by our “valua-
tional intuitions” but rather seems to offer the possibility of understand-
ing their origins.
Because this is such an important area of disagreement in discussions
of science and religion, let me spend a few more paragraphs on a major
issue: the place of physics in the order of disciplines. Can one offer an
account of our world that in its fundamental ontology is radically differ-
ent from the view of the world in contemporary physics?
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the level of particle theory there might be a quite different theory, formu-
lated perhaps in terms of superstrings, twistors, or quantized building
blocks of space-time in a yet unknown theory of quantum gravity. Such
changes may well have consequences for our concepts of object, space,
time, substance, and force and for ideas on determinism and causality.
But such a change in physics would respect the hierarchical structuring of
phenomena and of the corresponding sciences, which is more or less the
backbone of contemporary science, from quarks to nuclei to atoms and
molecules to macromolecules, and on to living organisms, followed by
consciousness and culture. We might change our understanding of the
foundation of reality, ontologically speaking, but fundamental physics is
a kind of pinnacle of the building of knowledge. If physics were to
change, the building would not collapse, though it might need some
reorganizing.
A more radical alternative would be one that would in some way reject
this overall pattern of the natural sciences and the difference between the
order of knowing and the order of being (with physics fundamental in
the latter though not in the former). In discussions about the relationship
between science and religion, the most prominent example of such an
alternative is process philosophy, which draws on the categorial scheme
developed by Alfred N. Whitehead in his Process and Reality (1929). On
this view, values and choices are relevant at the most fundamental level of
reality. Physics is adequate for uninteresting entities, such as electrons or
stones, whereas features that show up most clearly in human relations are
characteristic of the most fundamental structure of reality; the Garden
has priority over the Machine.
The attempt to develop such an alternative view of the fundamental
structure is legitimate. It would be a remarkable change in the history of
ideas if such an alternative organization of scientific knowledge replaced
the consensus view, but it is not to be rejected a priori. Such accounts
should at least be comparable in detail and precision to those of the cur-
rently dominant view. With respect to process philosophy, I am not con-
vinced that the categorical scheme that gives a metaphysically basic role
to values and choices can be developed in sufficient quantitative detail,
nor do I expect it to be more adequate then the standard view. I thus see
no reason to abandon the physicalist version of naturalism for an organis-
mic one.
3. RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE
Religion is related not only to explanatory enterprises and their limit
questions but also to ways of life. Any naturalist, whether religious or
atheistic, should acknowledge the existence of religious traditions as
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tures, as products of a long biocultural evolution. We have a physical
memory of the past in our genes and further implicit and explicit heri-
tage in our cultures, languages, and moral and religious traditions,
passed on through example and in books. The fact that these traditions
arose and were passed on from generation to generation (unlike others
that disappeared) implies that surviving traditions embody well-
winnowed practical wisdom that deserves attention, though in new cir-
cumstances not necessarily uncritical allegiance.
Among those who have sought to articulate an understanding of the-
ology in the context of such a naturalist view of religion, Ralph Burhoe is
the one who has emphasized most strongly the character of traditions as
“well-winnowed wisdom.” For him, the overwhelming power of the evo-
lutionary process relates to our images of God’s sovereignty. Gerd Theis-
sen (1985) emphasizes the variety of adaptations that arose through
evolution; he underlines tolerance or grace as the main characteristic of
ultimate reality. Philip Hefner also relates “the way things are” to God;
altruism and love are interpreted by Christian theology “as expression of
basic cosmological and ontological principles” (Hefner 1993, 197). This
need not imply that we derive religious convictions from scientific
insights; in the religious myths and their interpretations reality may be
disclosed in such a way as to stimulate us to spiritually and morally
appropriate responses.
Aside from those who seek to identify characteristics of the evolution-
ary process and reality as a whole, there are also some who have sought to
see religious language as language about some aspect of reality. Thus,
Lindon Eaves sees it as dualistic language that we use to speak about fea-
tures “lost in the mists of evolution and hidden from language and logic
in the genetic code” (Eaves 1991, 499) and which we also use to articu-
late an ought in the world of is. Charley Hardwick’s “valuational theism”
also seems to be a promising proposal (Hardwick 1996).
My own view, which seeks to take evolution seriously not only as a
feature of the world (an issue developed theologically by Peacocke [1993]
and others) but also as the explication of human religious traditions,
resembles these latter approaches in seeking to understand the function
of religions within the evolutionary process rather than looking for some
general characteristic of the process.
Religious traditions are complex entities. A way of life may be sug-
gested by parables, as for instance that of the Good Samaritan helping a
stranger from another culture (Luke 10:29–37), by historical narratives
(such as various accounts of prophets protesting against injustice, or of
Jesus forgiving those who persecuted him), and it may be articulated
more explicitly, as in the Ten Commandments (Deuteronomy 5:6–21).
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ideal that surpasses any actual achievable goal or situation. Thus, relig-
ious traditions include elements such as the Kingdom, Paradise, Heaven,
nirvana, immortality, emptiness, openness, perfection, and unconditional
love. Such notions function as regulative ideals with which actual behav-
ior is contrasted in order to evaluate it. A tradition’s way of life is
affirmed and strengthened by the particular forms of worship and devo-
tion of that religious tradition. Worship and other forms of ritual behav-
ior express and nourish the individual and communal spirituality in
relation to the joys, sorrows, and challenges of life and to the conceptions
and ultimate ideals of the good life. Religious traditions are not only
ways of life; believers see their religious way of life as rooted in certain
claims about historical events, ultimate destiny, or authoritative com-
mandments. These claims are supposed to justify the way of life espoused
by a tradition as the way one should live one’s life; justified because the
traditions derive from an authoritative source, because they deliver future
happiness, or because they correspond to the way reality is intended to be
or deep down really is.
Religious variety is intelligible and valuable. However, we do not have
to accept any tradition without critical scrutiny, or as a yes-or-no package
deal. Change is characteristic of our history, and there is no need to
exclude religious traditions from it. Circumstances may have changed
and therefore models of the good life or forms of worship may have to
change. This is certainly the case when we consider the human condition
today: we are vastly more numerous, stand in a fundamentally different
relation to nature, are more powerful than ever before, and are con-
fronted with neighbors across the globe. Not only have our circumstances
changed but so have our moral and spiritual sensitivities, for example,
with respect to conflicts between ethnic or religious groups, the relations
between men and women, and slavery or cruelty to animals. One more
reason for change, but not the most important one, is the cognitive credi-
bility of a tradition. If the images and claims by which the way of life
used to be justified have become incredible, that too challenges the relig-
ious tradition, though more indirectly than challenges to its practical,
moral, and spiritual adequacy.
Granted that we may have to discard some traditions or may have to
modify them, why would one keep any such tradition alive? The reason
is, in my opinion, that they are useful and powerful. They are useful and
powerful not only for unreflective moments and persons but also for
reflective and well-informed persons. No humans are only rational beings
who can entertain all their motives and desires consciously and intention-
ally; the structure of our brains is such that much goes on that is not
dealt with consciously. This is the risk involved in religious forms of
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reason for their importance: through religious metaphors and forms of
behavior we address reality in a way that confronts us with ideals, with
what ought to be, with a vision of a better world, or with images of a
paradisiacal past or an ultimate comforting presence.
At this point, authors such as Hefner and Theissen propose another
argument: we entertain religious traditions because they are true to the
way things really are or to the way reality ultimately is. This seems to me
to be a claim that goes—when understood in a realistic way—too far
beyond, if not counter to, experience. And if the religious ideals are
claimed to correspond to the way reality really is, the crucial function of
a tradition, namely, in providing a guiding vision that shapes our way of
life by envisaging a reality different from the way things currently are, is
undermined. Unless, as Hefner and others may well be taken to mean,
the way things are is referring not so much to our reality as experienced
as to a transcendental perspective on reality expressed through religious
myths. In that sense, talking about aims and values in terms of the way
things really are has its advantages; it uses a figure of speech that expresses
basic trust and refers beyond one’s local environment.
In this paper I have considered the variety of particular religious tradi-
tions, each functional in its own way in certain circumstances, and (in
1.4) the room for speculations on philosophical limit questions about the
world as a whole.
In my view, these two approaches can complement each other. I do
not mean that they together result in a complete view, but I suggest that
we see them as independent contributions that can be brought together
in a larger worldview. The openness expressed in the limit questions may
induce a sense of wonder and gratitude about the reality to which we
belong. Such a cosmological approach might primarily be at home with a
mystical form of religion, a sense of unity and belonging, as well as
dependence upon something that surpasses our world. The functional
view of religion offers some opportunities for a prophetic form of relig-
ion, with a contrast between what is the case and what it is believed
ought to be the case. The contrast might be seen as a consequence of our
evolutionary past, which has endowed us with wisdom that is encoded in
our constitution and in our culture (including religious traditions).
Another way to articulate a prophetic element is to argue that evolution
has endowed us with the capacity for imagination, for reconsidering our
situation from a different perspective. This capacity has as its limit the
regulative ideal of an impartial view transcending all our perspectival
views. That such a point of view is inaccessible is beneficial because this
protects us from fanaticism; if we were inclined to believe that our view
were the final one, then we would not be inclined to self-questioning
Willem B. Drees 539(Sutherland 1984, 110). It is precisely in this role that a speculative
approach, in response to limit questions, with a radical notion of divine
transcendence may be of major significance in our dealings with particu-
lar traditions. When considered in relation to the radical concept of
divine transcendence, all regulative ideals as they arise in particular
religious traditions are relativized; they can never lay unrestricted claim to
our allegiance.
We know collectively a great deal about our world. Our knowledge is
also limited. Certain phenomena may be intractable, even though they fit
into the naturalist framework. And limit questions regarding the whole
naturalist framework can be posed but will not be answered. The evolu-
tionary process has endowed us with capacities and limitations. Our
knowledge and our capacity for knowledge have arisen in the midst of
life, and if we are to use them anywhere at all, it will have to be there.
They allow us to wonder about that which transcends and sustains our
reality, but all the time we wander in the reality in which we live, move,
and have our being; to its future we contribute our lives.
NOTE
IdeasexpressedinthispaperhavebeenarticulatednotonlyattheannualmeetingoftheAmeri-
can Academy of Religion, 26 November 1996 in New Orleans, but also at the Sixth European
Conference on Science and Theology in Kraków, Poland, March 1996; the conference on evolu-
tionandmolecularbiologyorganizedbytheCenterforTheologyandtheNaturalSciencesandthe
Vatican Observatory, June 1996; consultations of the Center of Theological Inquiry in 1994 and
1996; and in the first and fifth chapters of my Religion, Science, and Naturalism. I thank partici-
pants at those conferences and persons who have commented on my book for their criticisms,
questions, and suggestions.
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